IN, FROM, AND TO SPACE: SAFEGUARDING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND HER INTERESTS

PETER Y. KIM*

“Space: the final frontier . . . to boldly go where no man has gone
before.”1
– Captain James T. Kirk
ABSTRACT
This Comment serendipitously pays homage to Professor Bin
Cheng’s Studies in International Space Law, by re-examining topics
covered in his trailblazing work and by exploring how the United
States Space Force may exist under current international law.
Although military use of outer space is limited by international
treaties and customary law, the United States of America must be
prepared to protect her interests from future threats. Cue the Space
Force, which will need to navigate a novel theater of war and
anticipate legal consequences under space law, the law of war, and
the law of the sea. Using the present legal framework is only the
beginning, as only time will tell how space warfare will unfold.
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friends; to Quinn Dunkak, Nathan Gill, Danuta Egle, and the rest of the University
of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law editors for your fantastic work in revising
this Comment; and to God because nothing is impossible with Him.
1
Cyriaque Lamar, Read the first drafts of the Star Trek opening monologue,
GIZMODO (Dec. 4, 2011, 3:15 PM), https://io9.gizmodo.com/read-the-first-draftsof-the-star-trek-opening-monologu-5864819 [https://perma.cc/JK8R-GJEQ].
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INTRODUCTION

Eight years before Apollo 11 astronaut Neil Armstrong uttered
his eleven mythical words that forever changed humanity’s
relationship with the moon, 2 President John F. Kennedy rallied
Congress and Americans to dream of space. 3 On September 12,
1962, at a time when the United States appeared to be falling behind
in the space race,4 President Kennedy delivered a speech that noted
the challenges ahead:
Whether [space] will become a force for good or ill depends
on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of preeminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea
of peace or a new terrifying theater of war. I do not say . . . we
should or will go unprotected against the hostile misuse of
space any more than we go unprotected against the hostile
use of land or sea, but I do say that space can be explored
and mastered without feeding the fires of war, without
repeating the mistakes that man has made . . . .5
2
Olivia B. Waxman, Lots of People Have Theories About Neil Armstrong’s ‘One
Small Step for Man’ Quote. Here’s What We Really Know, TIME (July 15, 2019, 12:39 PM
EDT),
https://time.com/5621999/neil-armstrong-quote/
[https://perma.cc/YSR8-X53W] (“At 10:56 p.m. ET on July 20, 1969, the American
astronaut Neil Armstrong put his left foot on the lunar surface and famously
declared, ‘That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.’”).
3
See John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Special Message
to the Congress on Urgent National Needs (May 25, 1961) (transcript available in
the
John
F.
Kennedy
Presidential
Library
and
Museum),
https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedyspeeches/united-states-congress-special-message-19610525
[https://perma.cc/2ZDM-BTDH].
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy declared before Congress:

[I]f we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between
freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred
in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in
1957 . . . . Now it is time to take longer strides—time for a great new American
enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in space achievement,
which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth.
Id. (emphasis added).
4
The Moon Decision, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM,
https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/apollo-to-the-moon/online/racing-tospace/moon-decision.cfm [https://perma.cc/J4JA-ERUW].
5
John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Address at Rice
University on the Nation’s Space Effort (Sept. 12, 1962) (emphasis added),
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Today, except for the occasional naysayer or conspiracy theorist,
most people accept the universal truth that, in the summer of 1969,
two American men walked on the moon.6
An unlikely torchbearer of President Kennedy’s legacy and
vision for space is former President Donald J. Trump. Although, in
2017, Representatives Jim Cooper (D-TN) and Mike Rogers (R-AL)
introduced the idea of a “Space Corps”7 in a bipartisan House bill,8
the concept went viral when President Trump shared five simple
words—“Space Force all the way!”—on the social media platform
Twitter. 9 On February 19, 2019, President Trump signed Space
https://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q63P-M36W].
President Kennedy is often quoted for the following soundbite:
We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade
and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are
hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our
energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to
accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win,
and the others, too.
Id.
6
Elizabeth Howell, Moon Landing Hoax Still Lives On, 50 Years After Apollo 11.
But Why?, SPACE.COM (July 19, 2019), https://www.space.com/apollo-11-moonlanding-hoax-believers.html [https://perma.cc/USM5-F9UD] (citing an estimate
by former NASA chief historian Roger Launius, who recently reported that
approximately “5% of Americans believe the Apollo moon landings were faked”);
see also Olivia McKelvey, Conspiracy theorist punched by Buzz Aldrin still insists moon
landing was fake, USA TODAY (July 20, 2019, 8:22 AM ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/07/20/man-punchedbuzz-aldrin-still-says-moon-landing-fake/1784847001/ [https://perma.cc/4BHEYQYV] (“Yet half a century later, despite other moon landings, moon rocks and
firsthand accounts from countless members of the 400,000-strong workforce who
helped achieve JFK’s goal, some still believe the moon landings were staged in a
Hollywood studio.”).
7
Congressman Proposes A Military ‘Space Corps’, NPR (June 25, 2017, 8:06 AM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2017/06/25/534286469/congressman-proposes-amilitary-space-corps [https://perma.cc/RF3J-MX78] (“There could be a new
branch of the United States military in the near future, and its mandate will be outer
space. It’s not called Starfleet like ‘Star Trek,’ sadly. It’s been named Space
Corps.”).
8
See FY18 National Defense Authorization Bill, H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. § 1601
(2017),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170628/106123/BILLS115HR2810ih-STR.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7MG-THJN].
9
Brett Samuels, Trump celebrates Pentagon proposal: ‘Space Force all the way!’,
HILL
(Aug.
9,
2018,
12:27
PM
EDT),
THE
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/401094-trump-celebratespentagon-proposal-space-force-all-the-way [https://perma.cc/6J9X-F2AX]; see also
Eric Mack, US Space Force: Everything you need to know on its first anniversary, CNET
(Dec. 20, 2020, 7:55 AM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/donald-trump-space-
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Policy Directive—4 (SPD-4), 10 “centralizing all military space
functions under a new Space Force, which [would] be overseen by
the Department of the Air Force.”11 Although the President could
not unilaterally create a new military branch, 12 with renewed
congressional support, 13 on December 20, 2019, President Trump
signed the United States Space Force (“Space Force”) into existence,
as the “first new armed service since 1947 . . . .”14
The United States Space Force Act (“the Act”) establishes the
Space Force “as an armed force within the Department of the Air
Force.”15 The Act prioritizes the following functions and duties for
the new military branch:
(c) FUNCTIONS.—The Space Force shall be organized, trained,
and equipped to provide –

force-everything-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/4JJK-3MYG] (noting that
President Trump first mentioned a “Space Force” in a March 2018 speech to
Marines).
10
See Donald J. Trump, Text of Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the
United
States
Space
Force,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Feb.
19,
2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policydirective-4-establishment-united-states-space-force/
[https://perma.cc/6Z4NN5MF].
11
Valerie Insinna, Trump officially organizes the Space Force under the Air
(Feb.
19,
2019),
Force . . .
for
now,
DEFENSENEWS
https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/02/19/trump-signs-off-onorganizing-the-space-force-under-the-air-forcefor-now/
[https://perma.cc/5GGN-37MM].
12
See Jim Garamone, DOD Sends Space Force Legislation to Congress, U.S. DEP’T
OF
DEF.:
DOD
NEWS
(Mar.
1,
2019),
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1771782/dodsends-space-force-legislation-to-congress/
[https://perma.cc/95M7-4DBX]
(explaining that the Space Force legislation required passage in Congress).
13
Claudia Grisales, With Congressional Blessing, Space Force is Closer to Launch,
NPR
(Aug.
11,
2019,
7:00
AM
ET),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/11/743612373/with-congressional-blessingspace-force-is-closer-to-launch [https://perma.cc/TJ9K-SDFS].
14
Jim Garamone, Trump Signs Law Establishing U.S. Space Force, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF.:
DOD
NEWS
(Dec.
20,
2019),
https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/2046035/trump-signs-lawestablishing-us-space-force/ [https://perma.cc/77B6-S228] (“Trump signed the
National Defense Authorization Act . . . [and a] provision of the voluminous law
created the service that will be totally focused on organizing, training and
equipping Space Force . . . .”).
15
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Subtitle D –
United States Space Force, S. 1790, 116th Cong. § 9081(a) (2019) [hereinafter United
States Space Force Act], https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS116s1790enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AAG-ZWEK].
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(1) freedom of operation for the United States in, from,
and to space; and
(2) prompt and sustained space operations.
(d) DUTIES. —It shall be the duty of the Space Force to—
(1) protect the interests of the United States in space;
(2) deter aggression in, from, and to space; and
(3) conduct space operations.16
This new military branch will likely conduct missions involving:
(1) space support,17 (2) force enhancement,18 (3) space control,19 and
(4) space force. 20 The Space Force will accomplish its duties by
among other things, shielding America’s satellites from attacks that
“could threaten our everyday lives, from our cell phones to the
electric grid to the military’s ability to launch nuclear weapons.”21
During his confirmation hearing, former Defense Secretary Mark
Esper called space a “warfighting domain . . . because the Russians
and Chinese are making it that way.”22 More specifically, countries
Id. § 9081(c)–(d).
JEREMY RABKIN & JOHN YOO, STRIKING POWER: HOW CYBER, ROBOTS, AND
SPACE WEAPONS CHANGE THE RULES FOR WAR 196 (2017) (defining “space support”
as “the launching of missiles and satellites and the management of satellites in
orbit”).
18
Id. at 196–97 (describing the general aim of improving “the effectiveness of
terrestrial military operations,” which includes passive surveillance and
strengthened civilian and military support for terrestrial operations).
19
Id. at 198 (characterizing the third mission type as securing “the ability to
freely use space to one’s benefit while denying it to opponents”).
20
Id. at 199 (stating missions will use “weapons systems based in orbit that
can strike targets on the ground, in the air, or even in space”).
21 See Grisales, supra note 13.
22
Id. (emphasis added). Defense Secretary Esper’s confirmation hearing
opening statement observed:
16
17

[T]he growing threats posed by great power competitors such as China
and Russia warrant a re-focus to high intensity conflict across all of the
Military Services. This requires us to modernize our forces and capitalize
on rapid technological advancements . . . ; and with your help, establish
the United States Space Force.
Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense Nominee, Department of Defense, Opening
Statement at the Hearing to Conduct a Confirmation Hearing on the Expected
Nomination of: Honorable Mark T. Esper to be Secretary of Defense Before the
Committee on Armed Services 17 (July 16, 2019) (transcript available at Alderson
Court
Reporting
in
Washington,
D.C.),
https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/19-59_07-16-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TP9-Q4V5].
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such as Russia, China, and India are already capable of destroying
their own satellites.23 It follows that these same States are likewise
equipped to shoot down America’s satellites. 24 International law
prohibits militarizing outer space, “but that has not stopped
speculation on the usefulness of outer space as strategic military
outposts and dominion of influence.”25 After all, World War III may
be fought in space.26
This Comment investigates how the United States may form a
robust Space Force under current applicable law. Part II examines,
through the lens of space law, the necessary prescription for this
new military branch, so it will not hinder the pacifistic objectives of
international treaties. Part III explores the law of war and rules of
engagement for this untested warfront. Part IV draws analogies to
the law of the sea for how military operations will occur in the high
tide of space. Part V advises policymaking and international
cooperation as the mechanisms to develop a cohesive
understanding on space warfare. This Comment concludes with
additional considerations in the implementation of the Space Force.
II. SPACE LAW ACROSS THE UNIVERSE
During his transition to the White House, President-Elect
Kennedy received a January 10, 1961 Ad Hoc Committee on Space
Report (the “Wiesner Report”) identifying both ballistic missiles and
military space systems as space activities. 27 The Wiesner Report
Grisales, supra note 13.
Grisales, supra note 13.
25
GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN THE AIRSPACE AND
OUTER SPACE 266 (1st ed. 2012).
26
Mark R. Whittington, Deterring World War III with Trump’s Space Force, THE
HILL
(July
5,
2018,
6:00
PM
EDT),
https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/395705-deterring-world-war-iii-withtrumps-space-force [https://perma.cc/9RHJ-AT6E] (“A United States Space Force,
dedicated to defending America’s assets beyond the Earth and to place those of an
enemy at risk, would be an instrument for making sure that war never breaks out.”).
27
MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, JENIFER K. LAMIE & MARIA-VITTORIA “GIUGI”
CARMINATI, THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDE FOR NEW SPACE LAWYERS 73 (2012)
(noting that Professor Jerome B. Wiesner of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) led the “first-of-its-kind” transition team on space issues); Wiesner Committee,
“Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space,” January 10, 1961,
NASA
[hereinafter
Wiesner
Committee],
https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/report61.html
[https://perma.cc/B2UB-P7Z3] (last updated Jan. 15, 2004).
23
24
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indicates that developing space’s “military systems” and “armslimitation inspection and control systems” would contribute to
national security. 28 Among other things, the Wiesner Report
recommends the military establish “a single responsibility” to take
charge of the space program’s military component. 29 In other
words, even back then, America needed a Space Force.30
However, a new space weaponization race may ignite if the laws
that currently forbid it are circumvented. 31 To move forward
without sparking such a race, the Space Force should carefully
examine international space law, which exists through five United
Nations (U.N.) outer space treaties from the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).32 Inherent in these five
treaties33 is the belief that humankind shares space and must travel
Wiesner Committee, supra note 27.
Wiesner Committee, supra note 27.
30
See generally Wiesner Committee, supra note 27.
postulates:
28
29

The Wiesner Report

If the responsibility of all military space developments were to be assigned
to one agency or military service within the Department o[f] Defense, the
Secretary of Defense would then be able to maintain control of the scope
and direction of the program and the Space Council would have the
responsibility for settling conflicts of interest between NASA and the
Department of Defense.
Wiesner Committee, supra note 27.
31
ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 268–69 (noting that “it would be reckless for the
law to proceed in a manner that allows” weaponizing space). In a faraway fictional
galaxy, the severe consequences of a lack of space law principles gives rise to the
weaponization of space. See, e.g., Vader Arrives on the Death Star, STAR WARS,
https://www.starwars.com/video/vader-arrives-on-the-death-star
[https://perma.cc/L6GJ-ZJW4] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021).
32
Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE
AFFS.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html
[https://perma.cc/B5FB-2TUU] (last visited Feb. 20, 2021). These treaties are: (1)
the “Outer Space Treaty”; (2) the “Rescue Agreement”; (3) the “Liability
Convention”; (4) the “Registration Convention”; and (5) the “Moon Agreement.”
Id. The United States is a State Party to the first four agreements, but not to the
“Moon Agreement.” See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of
International Agreements relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2019,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/CRP.3 (2019) [hereinafter Status of International
Agreements],
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_20
19_CRP03E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4TC-Y9XZ]. Out of scope for this Comment
are the “Liability Convention,” the “Registration Convention,” and the “Moon
Agreement.”
33
A treaty is “an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
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there in peace.34 Because the U.N. and the COPUOS will likely stay
steadfast to “their very primal duties to maintain global peace,”
instead of giving rise to outer space’s militarization,35 it is essential
to understand the current landscape of space law.
More
importantly, American military and civilian lawyers will need to
“critically analyze international law proposals and aggressively
proffer alternative views” to counteract other States’ attempts “to
interpret existing international law in such a way as to limit
American freedom of action in outer space.”36
a. Outer Space Treaty (OST)
To capture the composition of space law, refer to this quote from
J.R.R. Tolkien:
One [Treaty] to rule them all,
One [Treaty] to find them,
One [Treaty] to bring them all
and in the darkness [of space] bind them.37
The first place to look is the Outer Space Treaty (OST), which is
akin to space law’s Magna Carta. 38 On January 27, 1967, the OST
“was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow” and on October

or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation . . . .”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
34
See generally G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Jan. 27, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty],
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspace
treaty.html [https://perma.cc/4S7U-A2BX].
35
ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 267–68.
36
John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L. REV.
107, 117 (2010). See also RICHARD K. GARDINER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 (2003)
(emphasis in original) (“International law applies between states. . . . These areas are
the communal parts of water (principally, the sea), and of the air, and the whole of
outer space.”).
37
J.R.R. TOLKIEN, The Fellowship of the Ring, in THE LORD OF THE RINGS 50
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2004).
38
Bellflower, supra note 36, at 121. Tolkien would likely find the OST to be
the One Treaty to rule over the remaining four U.N. outer space treaties.
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10, 1967 “entered into force” of law,39 becoming a “supreme law”
under Article VI of the Constitution.40 As of January 1, 2019, the
United States and another 108 States are parties to the OST, and an
additional twenty-three States are signatories awaiting ratification.41
Moreover, due to its widespread acceptance, the OST applies to all
States—even nonparties to the treaty—because it “has risen to the
level of customary international law . . . .” 42 Yet even with
successful application of the OST, there is a trend towards the
international community’s desire to restrain the United States’
“freedom of action in outer space.”43
In reality, although there is a shared aspiration to cooperate in
space and a hypothetical forceful aggression would be condemned,
“all spacefaring states today have military missions, goals, and
contingency space-operations plans.”44 In this climate, the United
States must navigate under the OST because it mandates that space
use and exploration are bound by “international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining

39
Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“By the terms of the
treaty, the United States has agreed to be internationally liable for its space objects
and retain jurisdiction over its own objects and persons.”), abrogated by Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
40
U.S. CONST. art. VI (acknowledging that “all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land”).
41
Status of International Agreements, supra note 32.
42
KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 61. See also Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[C]ustomary international
law includes only ‘those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those
states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.’” (quoting IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975))), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); WILLIAM H.
BOOTHBY & WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, THE LAW OF WAR: A DETAILED
ASSESSMENT OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 3 (2018)
(reminding “that it is the general practice of States supported by opinio juris, not the
practice of an individual State, that must be demonstrated to establish a customary
law rule”).
43
Bellflower, supra note 36, at 117.
44
Bellflower, supra note 36, at 108 (quoting EVERETT C. DOLMAN, ASTROPOLITIK:
CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS IN THE SPACE AGE 2 (2002)).
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international peace and security . . . .”45 Thus, international law applies
similarly here on earth as in space.46
Additionally, under the principle of res communes, 47 exclusive
ownership of space is disallowed under the OST because “[o]uter
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation, or by any other means.”48 Space must be shared by
all.49 For example, when eight nations in 1976 attempted to expand
their sovereignty into their respective geostationary orbit under the
Bogotá Declaration, Article II of the OST estopped them. 50 The
United States must not appear territorial, as if pursuing Manifest
Destiny in outer space, and instead balance its interests with those
of the rest of the world. But even “in the sovereign-less reaches of
outer space, each state party to the treaty will retain jurisdiction over
its own objects and persons.”51
Under Article VI, the OST requires that States ensure their
“national activities in outer space,” including those “carried on by
governmental agencies” such as the Space Force, comply with the
treaty. 52 The OST, in Article VII, ensures that States receive
international liability “for damage to another State Party to the
Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the

45
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. III (emphasis added). Article III of
the OST may incorporate the prohibition against nations’ threats of using force to
hinder “the territorial integrity or political independence” of other nations under
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 205.
46
International law includes the Law of War and the Law of the Sea, which
this Comment discusses in Parts III and IV, respectively.
47
KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62. See Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 34, at art. II. Res communes is defined as “things owned by no one and
subject to use by all: things (as light, air, the sea, running water) incapable of entire
exclusive
appropriation.”
Res
Communes,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20communes
[https://perma.cc/76U9-LZVF] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
48
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II.
49
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II.
50
All nations receive sovereignty within their airspace. See KLEIMAN, LAMIE
& CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62.
51
Beattie, 756 F.2d at 100.
52
This provision also applies to “non-governmental entities,” which are
beyond the scope of this Comment. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VI.
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moon and other celestial bodies.”53 This provision would apply to
the Space Force, if: (1) the United States “launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space,” and that “object” or
“component part” was used to the detriment of another “State
Party . . . or to its natural or juridical persons[,]” or (2) the United
States was the “territory or facility [from which] an object is
launched,” and created such damage.54
In addition to the potential liability the United States may face
under the OST should Space Force activity appear bellicose, Article
IV provides an effective framework of what it—as a State Party—
and its Space Force may or may not do expressly. Please refer to
Table 1 below.55
Table 1: Acceptable Versus Unacceptable Activities Under the OST
States Parties to the Treaty
may:
 On the moon and other
celestial bodies:
o Use exclusively for
peaceful purposes
o Use required
facility or
equipment for

States Parties to the Treaty may
not:
 “[P]lace in orbit56 around
the Earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons
or any other kinds of
weapons of mass
destruction [(“WMDs”)] . . .
or station such weapons in

53
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VII; see also G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI),
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Nov.
29, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (stating
that “a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or the aircraft, and liable for
damage due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for
the settlement of claims for damages”). Under the Liability Convention, this
liability is joint and several. See Liability Convention, supra. The United States is a
State Party to the Liability Convention. See Status of International Agreements,
supra note 32. This Comment will not examine the Liability Convention in further
detail.
54
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. VII.
55
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV.
56
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF. LAW OF WAR
MANUAL ¶ 14.10.3.1 (updated Dec. 2016) (quoting Outer Space Treaty art. IV); see
also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV (elaborating that “[t]he prohibition
on placing weapons of mass destruction ‘in orbit around the earth’ . . . does not ban
the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction that go into a fractional
orbit or engage in suborbital flight.”).
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outer space in any other
manner.”
On celestial bodies:
o Establish military
bases, installations,
and fortifications
o Test any weapon
o Install any nuclear
weapon or WMD
o Conduct military
maneuvers

Read in tandem, in addition to what is allowed expressly under
Article IV (i.e., the chart’s left column), the Space Force is permitted
impliedly in Earth’s orbit: (1) to establish a military base,
installation, or fortification; (2) to test a non-nuclear or non-WMD
weapon; and (3) to conduct a military maneuver.57 Thus, although
the Space Force is forbidden to build a military moon-base, it may
build an earth-orbiting base under Article IV,58 which also legally
authorizes the military to exercise kinetic and non-kinetic “selfdefense in outer space via non-nuclear weapons and non-weapons of
mass destruction.”59 Simply put, space law allows for “the passage
of weapons through space, such as ballistic missiles, the stationing
of reconnaissance satellites, or the basing of conventional weapons
in orbit.”60
The United States Department of Defense (DoD), in paragraph
14.10.4 of the DoD Law of War Manual, recognizes acceptable military
activities in space that fall within the “peaceful purposes”
requirement, including use of satellites for “observation or
information-gathering” and “lawful military activities in selfdefense (e.g., missile early warning, use of weapon systems) . . . but
aggressive activities that violate the Charter of the United Nations
57
See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.3.2 (noting that “[t]hese activities are prohibited only on
the moon and other celestial bodies, not in outer space itself”).
58
See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62.
59
Bellflower, supra note 36, at 127 (emphasis added).
60
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 195. See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note
56, ¶ 14.10.3.1 (“In addition, this rule in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty does
not establish any prohibitions with respect to weapons that are not weapons of
mass destruction (e.g., anti-satellite laser weapons or other conventional
weapons).”).
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would not be permissible.”61 To justify the need for a Space Force,
the United States shall hold strong to the belief that military
operations in space are not incongruent with “peaceful purposes”
and are for its self-defense.62
b. Rescue Agreement
A central premise of the OST and its progeny, the Rescue
Agreement,63 is that space activity is performed by “astronauts” that
serve as “envoys of all mankind[,]”64 and they should receive States’
protection when danger comes their way. 65 However, the Space
Force will likely possess its own brand of astronauts. Because
“astronaut” 66 is synonymous with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), a civilian space agency that focuses
on “U.S. space exploration and aeronautics research,” 67 this

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.4.
See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 205; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note
56, ¶ 14.10.4 (“The United States has interpreted use of outer space for ‘peaceful
purposes’ to mean ‘non-aggressive and beneficial’ purposes consistent with the
Charter of the United Nations and other international law.”).
63
G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (19 Dec. 1967)
[hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
64
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. V.
65
See KLEIMAN, LAMIE & CARMINATI, supra note 27, at 62 (“In the interest of
promoting international cooperation and collaboration in outer space, the
international community sought to protect astronauts by requiring States to help
those in danger. The general principle [under Article V of the OST] was later
expanded in the Rescue Agreement . . . .”).
66
Astronaut Biographies, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/astronauts
[https://perma.cc/68VS-YVRF] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (asserting that
“‘astronaut’ derives from the Greek words meaning ‘space sailor,’ and refers to all
who have been launched as crew members aboard NASA spacecraft bound for orbit
and beyond”).
67
What
Is
NASA?,
NASA
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features/nasa-knows/whatis-nasa-58.html [https://perma.cc/X5U4-JTMW].
61
62
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Comment will use the novel word “astrohoplite”68 to distinguish a
military Space Force soldier.69
The Rescue Agreement, expanding on the OST, obligates the
recovery of a discovered “space object or its component parts,”70 and
the rescue and return of “personnel of a spacecraft” due “to accident,
distress, emergency or unintended landing[.]” 71 If read broadly,
“personnel of a spacecraft” would include astrohoplites; however, if
read narrowly, it would include only astronauts. So, this is an
ambiguous term. The Supreme Court interprets treaties by first
examining “the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.”72 In Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, the Supreme Court
noted that traditional treaty interpretation tools are applied to an
ambiguous treaty provision, where the Court “may look beyond the
written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties.”73
Nowhere within the Rescue Agreement’s ten articles is the word
“astronaut.”74 However, in the Preamble that provides the treaty’s
brief history, the word “astronauts” appears twice when mentioning
the OST’s significance and the desire “to develop and give further
concrete expression” to the duties under the OST of “rendering . . .
all possible assistance to astronauts in the event of accident, distress
68
This term roughly translates to “space soldier” in Greek. See astro-, ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
https://www.etymonline.com/word/astro[https://perma.cc/2L89-N63U] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (defining “astro” as “star
or celestial body; outer space”); hoplite, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY,
https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=hoplite
[https://perma.cc/HEH6CELA] (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (defining “hoplite” as a “heavy-armed foot
soldier of ancient Greece”).
69
See, e.g., Kevin M. Hymel, First Soldiers in space, U.S. ARMY (Nov. 24, 2009),
https://www.army.mil/article/30900/first_soldiers_in_space
[https://perma.cc/W2N5-YWZR] (noting that even after then-Colonel Robert L.
Stewart “floated through the space shuttle Challenger’s cargo bay and over to his
jetpack,” he consciously said, “I am not an astronaut, I am a Soldier”).
70
Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at art. 5.
71
Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at art. 2 (emphasis added).
72
Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1508–09 (2017) (quoting
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988)).
73
Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. at 1511 (citing Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under international law, when the United States is a
State Party to a treaty, its duties are “determined by reference to the normal rules
of treaty interpretation, taking into account any relevant statements of
interpretation or reservations that the United States may have submitted, and that
have not been rejected by the other States party.” BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON
HEINEGG, supra note 42, at 3.
74
Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, at arts. 1–10.
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or emergency landing, the prompt and safe return of astronauts, and
the return of objects launched into outer space . . . .” 75
Unfortunately, the OST does not provide any clarification, as the
term “astronaut” is not defined within its text either.76
On the other hand, the practical construction of the Rescue
Agreement reasonably appears to broaden protections to those
found in space. By using the ambiguous phrase “personnel of a
spacecraft” as opposed to “astronauts,” the Contracting Parties
allow more parties to fall into the agreement’s shelter. More
importantly, the Contracting Parties knew of the term “astronaut”
and even used it in the Preamble, yet chose to not use it in the Rescue
Agreement’s articles.77
Finally, if this ambiguity ever becomes a conflict of laws
question, the United States applying its definition of “government
astronaut” may safeguard astrohoplites because § 50902(4) of the
United States Code, Title 51, provides that a “government
astronaut”:
(A) is designated by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration under section 20113(n);
(B) is carried within a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle in the
course of his or her employment, which may include
performance of activities directly relating to the launch,
reentry, or other operation of the launch vehicle or reentry
vehicle; and
(C) is either—
(i) an employee of the United States Government,
including the uniformed services, engaged in the
performance of a Federal function under authority of law
or an Executive act; or
(ii) an international partner astronaut.78
Rescue Agreement, supra note 63, pmbl. (emphasis added).
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34.
77
See Rescue Agreement, supra note 63.
78
51 U.S.C. § 50902(4) (2018). The astrohoplite would need to meet all three
prongs of this definition, including the first prong that follows section 20113(n):
75
76

For purposes of a license issued or transferred by the Secretary of
Transportation under chapter 509 [51 U.S.C. § 50901 et seq.] to launch a
launch vehicle or to reenter a reentry vehicle carrying a government
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Astrohoplites as members of the “uniformed services, [and]
engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of
law or an Executive act” would fall into this definition. 79 The
astrohoplites that will protect America from a new host of threats
may not necessarily fall neatly into the parameters of the OST and
the Rescue Agreement. Accordingly, the Space Force should apply
a broader reading of “personnel of a spacecraft” for other States’
astrohoplites, so that it may receive reciprocity,80 unless otherwise
applicable international law applies. It is important that the United
States begins to form a concrete view on this issue, as preparations
are being made81 and the Space Force has already sworn in its first
member, General John W. “Jay” Raymond, as the inaugural Chief of
Space Operations.82 In the near future, active duty astrohoplites will
be performing activities in space because as General Raymond
stated: “We no longer have the luxury of operating in a peaceful,

astronaut (as defined in section 50902), the Administration shall designate
a government astronaut in accordance with requirements prescribed by
the Administration.
51 U.S.C. § 20113(n) (2018) (giving NASA discretionary authority to designate a
“government astronaut”).
79 Id. § 50902(4)(C)(i). Arguably, all Space Force defensive and peacekeeping
activities would qualify as “performance of a Federal function under authority of
law or an Executive act[.]” Id.
80
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (observing that the authority of a
nation’s laws is limited to the nation’s sovereignty, and “[t]he extent to which the
law of one nation, . . . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another
nation, depends upon . . . ‘the comity of nations’”).
81 See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Trump reveals Space Force logo, and ‘Star Trek’ fans
POST
(Jan.
25,
2020,
9:55
AM
EST),
aren’t
happy,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/01/25/space-forcelogo/ [https://perma.cc/4M6W-HDPM]. The Space Force has selected an insignia
which bears some resemblance to that of Star Trek’s Starfleet Command. Id.
82 General John W. “Jay” Raymond, U.S. AIR FORCE, https://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/Article/108479/general-john-w-jay-raymond/
[https://perma.cc/NW2E-KWDL] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020) (noting Gen. John W.
‘Jay’ Raymond assumed the duties as the first Chief of Space Operations, United
States Space Force, Dec. 20, 2019); see David Welna, Commander Sworn in As First
Member Of New Space Force, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:12 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/796405754/commander-sworn-in-as-firstmember-of-new-space-force [https://perma.cc/24QM-UPKB] (“The first newly
created branch of the U.S. armed forces in more than seven decades now has its first
official member.”). As of April 27, 2020, there are six members in the Space Force.
See Katherine Hafner, ‘It Feels Awesome’—Meet the newly-graduated Air Force cadet
who just became the sixth member of Space Force, TASK & PURPOSE (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/how-many-people-are-in-space-force
[https://perma.cc/YAK2-ZJ67].
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benign domain, and we no longer have the luxury of treating space
superiority as a given.”83
III.

SPACEWALK THE LINE: THE LAW OF WAR AND RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARENA OF OUTER SPACE

On April 23, 1910, President Theodore Roosevelt at the Sorbonne
in Paris delivered his legendary “The Man in the Arena” speech,
noting that
[t]here are well-meaning philosophers 84 who declaim
against the unrighteousness of war . . . . War is a dreadful
thing, and unjust war is a crime against humanity. But it is such
a crime because it is unjust, not because it is a war . . . . Every
honorable effort should always be made to avoid war . . . but
no self-respecting individual, no self-respecting nation, can
or ought to submit to wrong.85

83
Welna, supra note 82. In May 2020, Netflix streamed an original show
sharing the same namesake as the military branch. See Mike Murphy, These are the
streaming services worth your money in May 2020, MARKETWATCH (May 10, 2020, 8:43
PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-whats-worth-streaming-inmay-2020-space-force-homecoming-ramy-and-more-2020-04-27
[https://perma.cc/W9VG-QQ89].
84
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. I at xvii (B. Jowett trans.,
Clarendon Press 1885), https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/jowett-the-politics-vol1#preview [https://perma.cc/6PPE-KV7J] (“Others again appeal to custom, which
they identify with justice; but this is a view which cannot be consistently
maintained. For a war which is justified by custom may nevertheless be an unjust
war[.]”).
85
Theodore Roosevelt, President, United States of America, The Man in the
Arena, THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR. AT DICKENSON STATE UNIV. (emphasis added),
https://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Learn-About-TR/TREncyclopedia/Culture-and-Society/Man-in-the-Arena.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ADS3-K8BK] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). President Roosevelt in
the same speech noted that

[i]t is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong
man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done them better.
The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena . . . who at the
best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the
worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall
never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor
defeat.
Id. (emphasis added). With proper guidance, the Space Force may achieve victory
and credit for being in the arena of space.
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Just war principles continue to inform the United States and the
rest of the world in their decision-making on military matters. 86
Because current international treaties do not “expressly address[]
space jus in bello rules, aside from the Outer Space Treaty’s WMD
ban,” the Space Force may look to applicable international laws—
such as the law of war87—that “regulate the conduct of hostilities,
regardless of where they are conducted, which would include the
conduct of hostilities in outer space.”88
a. Law of War
The law of war regulates a nation’s decision to use armed forces.
It is “firmly established” in treaties and customary international
laws, and such, applies to the United States.89 Moreover, the United
States holds the duty to act according to “both the law of initiating

86
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.6.4. Just war doctrine includes
“stringent limitations on the initial resort to war, jus ad bellum, and by seeking
humane limitations on the means by which war [is] waged, jus in bello.” GARY D.
SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 19
(2nd ed. 2010).
87
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Since the OST and the four other space law treaties are silent as to what
happens during war, “the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was trumped
by the principle of noninterference with space systems . . . None of [the four space
treaties] has any specific provision that indicates whether the parties intended that
the agreement apply in wartime.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.1 n.153
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def., Off. of the Gen. Counsel, An Assessment of International
Legal Issues in Information Operations (2nd ed., Nov. 1999), reprinted in 76 U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLL. INT’L LAW STUDIES 459, 494 (2002)). “Certain provisions of these treaties
may not be applicable as between belligerents during international armed conflict.”
Id. The DoD does not specify which provisions the U.S. may regard as inapplicable
during an international armed conflict. BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra
note 42, at 368.
88
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.2 (stating that the law of war
applies to outer space like “land, sea, air, or cyber domains”).
89
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶¶ 1.3, 1.3.2.2. The DoD uses several
definitions for the law of war. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.3.1.1.
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war (jus ad bellum)90 and the law of conducting war (jus in bello).”91
Knowing what “war” means is critical because it triggers when rules
related to jus in bello apply.92 One definition for “war” might be “a
State’s use of force to vindicate its rights (principally, its inherent
right of self-defense) under international law.”93
Under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,94 however, war is justified
when performed in self-defense to counter another State’s act of
aggression.95 Finding active self-defense as an exception to Article
2(4) 96 —a “cornerstone” of the U.N. Charter and the general
prohibition on war97—“leaves a wide arena for the use of force in
space.”98 Because the U.N. Charter “is a living instrument” and may
90
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 99 (2019) (citation omitted); see also id. at 97 (“[U]nder the international law of
jus ad bellum . . . the doctrine of self-defense may at times be invoked to use force—
based on a necessarily elongated notion of ‘imminence’—against those senior
operational leaders who present a ‘continuing and imminent threat’ of striking
against the United States.”).
91
Id. at 99 (“Under domestic law, the United States must follow the terms of
both the Constitution and the various statutory authorizations for, and restrictions
on, the use of military force.”). Use of force under jus in bello requires near perfect
confidence that civilians will not be injured or killed. Id. at 97.
92
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.2.
93
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.1. In fact, “war” is an ambiguous
term that is defined in various ways by the United States and other States under
international law. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 1.5.2.
94
U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defen[s]e if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”).
95
Id. This Comment will focus on the role of the United States as an
individual U.N. Member State responding to an armed attack. Out of scope are
anticipatory self-defense, collective self-defense, and obligations with respect to the
U.N. Security Council’s involvement under Article 51.
96 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”) (emphasis added).
97
See CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
(2018); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 124 (4th ed.
2018) (noting that Article 51 is a narrow exception to Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter). Additionally, customary international law forbids the use of force, or
even the threat of it. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 185 (June 27) (“In the present
dispute, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction only in respect of the application
of the customary rules of non-use of force and non-intervention, cannot disregard
the fact that the Parties are bound by these rules as a matter of treaty law and of
customary international law.”).
98
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 206.
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be reinterpreted based on States’ shared subsequent agreement and
practice, additional excepted activities to Article 2(4) may be added
under an expanding interpretation of Article 51. 99 Maintaining
flexibility in interpreting Article 51 allows the Space Force to station
astrohoplites in space to protect the United States and its orbiting
weapons systems capable of striking targets in, from, and to space.100
The United States and its astrohoplites must act righteously—and
know when there is no choice other than to respond in kind, tit for
tat.101
As certain terms have been left undefined by the U.N. Charter,102
disagreements have sprung up. One such debate is over Article
2(4)’s use of the word “threat,” which may prohibit either narrowly
“threats of unlawful force” or, broadly, “threats of possible lawful
force,” as they may, in turn, harm international security and
peace.103 Additionally, Article 2(4) provides no clarity on the gravity
of threat of force versus use of force, but de facto practice reveals
that States tolerate threats better than use of force, “and the U.N.
very rarely expresses any condemnation of the former.”104
On the other hand, with respect to self-defense, all nations
concur that it “must be necessary and proportionate.”105 In his 2009
Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Barack Obama
restated just war’s twin principles, noting that:
[O]ver time, as codes of law sought to control violence within
groups, so did philosophers and clerics and statesmen seek
to regulate the destructive power of war. The concept of a
See HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 19.
See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 199, 206.
101 See
Radiolab, Tit for Tat, WNYCSTUDIOS (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/segments/104010-one-gooddeed-deserves-another [https://perma.cc/NFL2-37UT]; see also Leon F. Seltzer, The
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the “Virtues” of Tit for Tat, PSYCH. TODAY (July 27, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-self/201607/theprisoner-s-dilemma-and-the-virtues-tit-tat [https://perma.cc/5YTM-N974] (“If,
reciprocally, your partner cooperates, you continue to cooperate; if they defect, you
respond in kind by immediately retaliating against them. This formula has,
ironically, been characterized as ‘conditional niceness,’ since it advocates for a kind
of provisional golden rule. And it’s a constant winner.”).
102
For example, both “threat” and “use of force” are left undefined by the
U.N. Charter. HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 26.
103
See GRAY, supra note 97, at 36–37 (“There is also a growing debate as to
what types of activities can amount to ‘use of force’ as opposed to intervention or
mere law enforcement.”).
104
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 30.
105
GRAY, supra note 97, at 157.
99

100
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“just war” emerged, suggesting that war is justified only
when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last
resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and
if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence.106
Necessity and proportionality are fact dependent on a case-bycase basis. 107 Because a reprisal is typically frowned upon as
unlawful, an act of self-defense “must not be retaliatory or punitive;
the aim should be to halt and repel an attack.”108 In reality, however,
there is a gray area between what constitutes self-defense and what
In the Space Force, these early
constitutes a reprisal. 109
determinations will likely be made by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy, as Section 955 of the Act expressly
provides that the Assistant Secretary’s principal duty will be to
oversee “policy of the Department of Defense for space
warfighting.”110 It is necessary and proper for the Space Force to
begin analyzing the facts and circumstances that provide for selfdefense in outer space, before policy transforms into law.111
i.

Necessity for Use of Force

First, if the Space Force intends to act in self-defense, it must
make a good faith showing of necessity, in that there is “no
alternative response to an armed attack . . . .”112 In other words, the
Space Force when acting in self-defense must establish either the
106
Barack H. Obama, 44th President of the U.S., Nobel Lecture: A Just and
Lasting Peace, (Dec. 10, 2009) (highlighting that adherence to international
standards for the use of force “becomes particularly important [for accountability]
when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the defense of
one nation against an aggressor”).
107
GRAY, supra note 97, at 159-60 (“In theory it is possible to draw a distinction
between necessity and proportionality, and the [International Court of Justice]
typically applies the two requirements separately.”).
108
GRAY, supra note 97, at 159-60.
109
GRAY, supra note 97, at 160; see also HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 241
(“[A]rmed reprisals are acts of forcible self-help, involving an unlawful use of force
falling short of war, by one state in response to a prior violation of international law
by another.”) (internal citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted).
110
S. 1790, 116th Cong. § 955(a) (2019) (enacted).
111
See KOH, supra note 90, at 18 (observing that “norms initially articulated as
policy for political reasons affect legal rulings and over time themselves harden into
law”).
112
GRAY, supra note 97, at 159.
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unavailability of “reasonable non-forcible measures” or the
“reasonable expectation that recourse to such measures would be
ineffective.” 113 A helpful fact is knowing whether the “armed
attack” was an act of terrorism, because if so, the Space Force may
respond to a ceased attack by invoking self-defense to prevent future
harm and this response will be received more favorably by the
international community.114 Pivotal to the necessity analysis is the
“nature of the armed attack, or threat thereof, in terms of the
weapons and methods used . . . .”115 There is universal agreement
that a right to self-defense is invoked by an “armed attack”;
however, it is unsettled what even constitutes one and how to
identify it due to “the special characteristics of particular
weapons.”116 In short, the necessity for self-defense may hinge on
certain facts, such as whether the perpetrators used or threatened to
use WMDs, conventional weaponry, or cyberattacks.117
Another threshold issue is based upon the Space Force’s
interpretation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which may be read
more inclusively or exclusively. 118 If reading Article 51 as an
expansionist, then self-defense equals “a right that nothing in the
Charter shall impair.” 119 From this viewpoint, this pre-existing
“inherent” right stems from “earlier customary international law”
that the U.N. Charter did not expressly strike and that recognized
“the protection of nationals and anticipatory” self-defense at the
time of the Charter’s implementation.120 Alternatively, restrictionists
assert that “if, and only if, an armed attack occurs and imminent
threats of attack are not covered by Article 51[,]”121 is self-defense
tolerable as a narrow exception to Article 2(4). 122 Regardless of
whether one is an expansionist or restrictionist—for a “one-off
minor incident” or “an ongoing conflict”—central to the States’
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 230.
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 231. For example, the United States’ response
to the acts of terrorism on 9/11 was “generally well received by other [S]tates.”
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 232.
115
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 233.
116
GRAY, supra note 97, at 134–35.
117
See HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 233.
118
GRAY, supra note 97, at 124.
119
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 277–78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
GRAY, supra note 97, at 124.
121
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 278.
122
GRAY, supra note 97, at 124 (noting that for those who share this view,
“Article 51 is clear; the right . . . arises only if an armed attack (French: aggression
armée) occurs”).
113
114
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controversy are “the questions of fact as to whether there has
actually been an armed attack of the type claimed and, if so, which
state was the victim.”123
ii.

Proportionality for Use of Force

Second, for self-defense to meet the proportionality
requirement, “[n]o more force or greater violence should be used to
carry out a military operation than is necessary in the
circumstances.”124 Because proportionality is a “constraint on the
scale and effects of defensive action,”125 factors used to determine it
are “the size, duration, and target of the response . . . .”126 Although
there are no underpinnings or guidelines, 127 proportionality is
referenced by States as the “criterion for a lawful act” to justify their
acts of self-defense and those of others.128 Proportionality depends
on the act falling under either jus ad bellum or jus in bello. 129 The
former measures the act in its totality, but “the latter considers the
force applied as against a specific military target as defined by
international law at any given point during that operation.”130
Space offers a sui generis environment for warfare. As there are
virtually no people in space—other than those boarded on the
International Space Station131 and on the occasional Virgin Galactic
spacecraft132—States may “harm each other without directly costing
GRAY, supra note 97, at 121.
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 258 (citation omitted).
125
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
126
GRAY, supra note 97, at 159 (“[T]hese factors are also relevant to necessity.”).
127
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 235.
128
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234.
129
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234.
130
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 234 (quoting Dino Kritsiotis, A Study of the
Scope and Operation of the Rights of Individuals and Collective Self-Defence under
International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND
SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM (Nigel D. White &
Christian Henderson eds., 2013), 170, 211–12 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131
See Doris Elin Urrutia, Crowded Space Station: There are 9 People from 4
Different Space Agencies in Orbit Right Now, SPACE.COM (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.space.com/space-station-crowded-nine-crewmembers-expedition60.html [https://perma.cc/E5DX-J22N].
132
See Mike Wall, Virgin Galactic’s VSS Unity space plane arrives at New Mexico
spaceport, SPACE.COM (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.space.com/virgin-galacticspaceshiptwo-unity-spaceport-america.html [https://perma.cc/8NKK-4TBP].
123
124
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the lives of combatants or civilians. Their use of force will destroy
satellites that can be replaced and cause only temporary economic
losses.” 133 So long as temporarily disabled communications and
transportation networks do not cause unintended consequences, no
one will need to die.134
The Space Force may deliver a reasonably calculated, temporary,
and proportional response on another nation’s “space-based
systems . . . without causing the death and destruction of terrestrial
combat.” 135 If the satellites, even though civilian-based, support
military functions, the Space Force may target them “under
traditional approaches to the laws of war. Military use of civilian
systems renders them liable to attack during armed conflict.” 136
Moreover, it is fair game for the Space Force to disable any militarypurchased “surveillance or communications bandwidth from
civilian providers[.]” 137 Another proposed self-defense tactic in
space may be aiming “ground-based lasers to temporarily blind
satellites or jam their connections with ground control stations.”138
This is in the realm of possibility for a proportionate response, as the
Space Force would produce a “loss” without the “death and
destruction of kinetic weapons.”139 This kind of warfare would be
similar to a game of keep away, in that the Space Force’s goal would
not be to destroy or create permanent damage to another State’s
resources or satellite systems, but merely frustrate the opponent for
a period of time until it acquiesces.140

133
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 221 (noting that loss of GPS signal or
slowed down Internet data may occur, “[b]ut no one dies, no infrastructure is
destroyed, and no lands or waters ruined”).
134
See RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 221.
135
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220.
136
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218. If a nation possesses no military
satellite systems, then attacking its “civilian space systems” is acceptable as the least
“destructive means of coercion. Disabling the space-based elements of a
communication system could pressure an opponent without causing any human
casualties, much in the same way as shutting down its Internet or financial
markets.” RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219.
137
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218.
138
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219.
139
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219.
140
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 219.
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b. Responding Tit for Tat—Self-Defense Matrices
Over the next decade, “constellations” of 800 to 1,000 “small and
miniaturized satellites both for imaging and communications” will
launch every year.141 As satellites become an even more essential
part of nations’ infrastructures,142 it is not a stretch to see how they
may be attacked to antagonize a State—especially when
communication services are “in higher demand as much of the
world spends more time at home due to the coronavirus
pandemic[.]”143 The United States, China, and Russia already have
earth-to-space “anti-satellite missiles,” and in the future, nations
will possess maneuverable satellites that may collide with another
State’s satellite system, simultaneously destroying it and creating
debris fields.144
Tables 2a and 2b provide hypothetical uses of force by Hostile
State against the United States, and how the Space Force may
respond with a necessary (“Nec.”) and proportional (“Prop.”)
response.

141
K.R. Sridhara Murthi & V. Gopalakrishnan, Trends in Outer Space Activities
– Legal and Policy Challenges, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 27, 31–32
(2017).
142
Id. at 30–31 (“More than fifty nations operate satellites in space, while over
100 nations are engaged in the use of space systems and services.”).
143
Eric Mack, Elon Musk says Starlink satellite broadband to start beta testing this
year, CNET (Apr. 23, 2020, 3:16 PM PT), https://www.cnet.com/news/elon-musksays-starlink-satellite-broadband-beta-testing-to-start-soon/
[https://perma.cc/6A8F-PEP7] (noting that SpaceX’s international filings indicate
plans to grow its Starlink constellation to more than 40,000 satellites for more
affordable internet access worldwide).
144
Dale Stephens, Increasing Militarization of Space and Normative Responses, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW 93 (2017).
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Table 2a: Self-Defense Matrix–Jus ad Bellum
Hostile State’s
Action

Use of
Force

Space Force’s Self-Defense

Nec.

Prop.

Shoots down ≤ 500 satellites
in Hostile State’s constellation

Likely
Yes146

Yes

Shoots down 1,000 satellites
in Hostile State’s constellation

Likely No

No

Electronically jams148 Hostile
State’s similarly sized
constellation / damages same
number of satellites’ optic
sensors

Likely Yes

Yes

Shoots down satellites in
Hostile State’s constellation

No149

No

Notify Hostile State of
damage done to constellation

Yes

Yes

Electronically jams Hostile
State’s similarly sized
constellation / damages same
number of satellites’ optic
sensors

No

No

JUS AD BELLUM
Shoots down
500 satellites in
constellation

Electronically
jams
constellation /
damages
satellites’ optic
sensors

Clears own
space debris,
which harms
constellation

Yes145

Yes147

Likely
No

145
Id. at 97 (“In the context of space activities, an Article 2(4) violation may be
manifested where activities are initiated by a State in space or on earth that causes
physical damage on target state’s terrestrial space-based infrastructure.”).
146
Id. at 98 (“[A State’s] parallel neutralization of blocking satellites, the
reciprocal ‘bumping’ and/or cyber reaction that disables a violating satellite . . . or
other space object may arguably be lawful reactions depending on the
circumstances, and the interests that are imperilled.”).
147
Id. at 97 (noting that “use of lasers to damage optic sensors of passing
satellites or otherwise ‘bumping’ or otherwise physically damaging satellites” are
additional Article 2(4) violations).
148
Dan Robitzski, Space Force Unveils Its First Weapon, A Satellite Jammer,
FUTURISM (Apr. 23, 2020), https://futurism.com/the-byte/space-force-firstweapon-satellite-jammer [https://perma.cc/XMU9-LE58] (“The U.S. Space Force
recently acquired its first offensive weaponry: a device capable of blocking satellite
communications, temporarily rendering orbiting satellites useless.”).
149
Stephens, supra note 144, at 98 (observing that a State may not use “kinetic
force” under these circumstances).
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Table 2b: Self-Defense Matrix–Jus in Bello
Hostile State’s
Action

Use of
Force

Space Force’s Self-Defense

Nec.

Prop.

Shoots down Hostile State’s
unmanned spacecraft

Likely Yes

Yes

Shoots down Hostile State’s
manned spacecraft

No

No

It
Depends

Yes

No

No

JUS IN BELLO150
Shoots down
unmanned
spacecraft

Shoots down
manned
spacecraft with
100
astrohoplites

Yes

Yes

Shoots down Hostile State’s
manned spacecraft ≤ 100
astrohoplites
Shoots down Hostile State’s
manned spacecraft carrying
prisoners of war, civilians, or
wounded / attacks a hospital,
school, or civilian home in
Hostile State151

c. Rules of Engagement
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are not law—international or
domestic152—but share an important role in warfare because they
“are the primary means of regulating the use of force in armed
conflict . . . They are akin to a tether, with which senior commanders
control the use of force by individual combatants.”153 To guide their
soldiers, nearly all States’ armed forces have a version of the ROE.154
If ROE were a wooden three-legged stool, then the three legs would
be “national policy, operational requirements and law.” 155 The
150
Stephens, supra note 144, at 98 (“At present, there is no specific Treaty that
regulates armed conflict in space.”).
151
This anticipates application of law of war principles, which would provide
protections over these individuals and locations.
152
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490 (“[Rules of Engagement] are military directives,
heavy with acronyms.”).
153
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495. To help the individual commander employ
their armed forces, the ROE are constructed with “the help of military lawyers and
implemented by those who execute the military mission.” SOLIS, supra note 86, at
495.
154
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490.
155
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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stool’s seat on top would be the foundational law of war and other
customary international law, “along with considerations of political
objectives and the military mission.” 156 ROE may limit a
commander’s action for certain issues (e.g., grant/denial for a certain
weapon’s use), but “ROE never limit the right and obligation of
combatants to exercise self-defense.”157 More similar to a code of
conduct, ROE do not provide instructions on executing military
missions because “ROE are not tactical in nature[.]”158
The Space Force must establish a substantial ROE for
astrohoplites because they are essential in meeting the standards the
United States must follow under the law of war “on the modern
battlefield”159—and ROE “are frequently cited when . . . violations
are alleged.”160 The Space Force should continue the tradition of any
astrohoplite’s misconduct under ROE to be “prosecuted as
violations of a lawful general order, a common Uniform Code of
Military Justice offense.” 161 In a Congressional hearing, General
Creighton Abrams, Jr.162 declared, “The rules [of engagement] have
been forever . . . a source of frustration to many commanders. And
they have had to live with them. And they have had to do their job
with them.”163
In 1994, the military “redesignated” ROE as the Standing Rules
of Engagement (“SROE”), which underwent a January 2000 revision
“to give individual self-defense increased emphasis.”164 Following
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495.
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495 (emphasis in original) (“[The ROE] may [not]
authorize a violation of LOAC/IHL . . . .”).
158
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 495.
159
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 491.
160
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490.
161
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 490 (citation omitted).
162
General Abrams was a four-star general who was “head of Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV, which oversaw all American combat
forces inside South Vietnam.” Brig. Gen. John D. Howard (ret.), This general
challenged the president and saved American lives, MILITARYTIMES (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.militarytimes.com/military-honor/saluteveterans/2017/11/02/this-general-challenged-the-president-and-savedamerican-lives/ [https://perma.cc/A39C-WMGH].
163
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 493 (quoting LEWIS SORLEY, THUNDERBOLT: GENERAL
CREIGHTON ABRAMS AND THE ARMY OF HIS TIMES 341 (1998)).
164
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494. See also SOLIS, supra note 86, at 502 (“All ROE
contain a clear statement of the right to self-defense. Occasionally, ROE also
describe escalation-of-force measures. Most contain other common elements
addressing enemy hostile acts, enemy hostile intent, dealing with enemy forces
declared hostile, and a positive identification requirement.”).
156
157
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current standards, the astrohoplite may use “self-defense, as long as
the opposing force remains a threat, it may be pursued and
engaged.”165 Under an objective standard for self-defense, “a soldier
is not necessarily required to employ each option before escalating
to the next higher force level, and when circumstances dictate, the
soldier may go immediately to deadly force.”166
In June 2005, SROE added Standing Rules for the Use of Force
(“SRUF”),167 which “apply in domestic civil support missions and
land defense missions within U.S. territory.” 168 The legal source
behind SROE are “generally shaped by international legal
obligations, such as the United Nations Charter, international
treaties, and customary international law[,]” whereas the SRUF “are
generally shared by domestic or host-nation legal obligations.”169 In
a future update of the SROE and SRUF, the Space Force’s
astrohoplites should be considered170 because the majority of space
will stay shared international territory; however, within the confines
of the Space Forces’ bases and ships are potentially United States
space (or waters).171
165
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 502 (“Unless the ROE specify otherwise, there is no
requirement that a self-defense engagement be terminated when the opposing force
attempts to break off contact.”).
166
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 505 (“ROE are interpreted in a reasonable way.”).
167
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494.
168
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494.
169
SOLIS, supra note 86, at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.2 (“[L]aw of war
treaties[,] the customary law of war[, the SROE, and the SRUF] are understood to
regulate the conduct of hostilities, regardless of where they are conducted, which
would include the conduct of hostilities in outer space.”).
171
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1. (“Outer space may be viewed
as analogous to the high seas in certain respects. For example, no State may claim
sovereignty over outer space.”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 56, ¶ 14.10.1, n.145. Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, 63 (Mar. 13, 1967) (“[O]nce we
leave airspace, and get to outer space, however you define the limits, this is an
attempt to create in outer space the closest analogy and that is the high seas.”);
Outer Space Treaty art. VIII:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body.
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed
or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not
affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their
return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the
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FINDING OPEN SPACE UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA

With a Space Force, the vastest ocean yet is next. From the
moment a United States Navy was created, “military use of the
oceans has been associated with the seas . . . .”172 The high seas are
often used as “the most common analogy for space” when looking
at implications on commerce and military expansion because “[i]f
similar to the high seas, space would allow any nation to deploy
both military and civilian craft free from interference.” 173 Unlike
outer space, the law over how the military uses waterways is quite
developed during times of war and peace.174 For war time, “Hague
law, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Protocols have
application, in addition to the distinctive international law that
applies to the sea during these times, including the laws of naval
warfare.”175 For peacetime, the third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS III”) sheds some light.176 The law of
the sea is a proven testing ground for “international law’s ability to
facilitate coexistence and interaction between states, and also
between their national systems of law.”177

limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are carried
shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish
identifying data prior to their return.
172
DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
259 (2010) (“[E]arly uses of the oceans were for the purpose of asserting naval power
with the objective of controlling the oceans.”).
173
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216.
174
ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (“[T]he linkages and tensions
between the law [of the sea] and naval operations became more prominent as the
law consolidated and was codified throughout the twentieth century.”). The OST
and the other space treaties only considered “peaceful purposes.” See, e.g., Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. IV (“The moon and other celestial bodies shall be
used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.”).
175
ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (emphasis added and internal
citations omitted). These wartime laws are out of scope for this Comment because
the current state of space is more closely related to the peacetime Law of the Sea.
“Two dimensions of general international law have particular relevance to military
operations at sea: the law of naval warfare, and UN-sanctioned naval operations.”
Id. at 260. Unfortunately, there are no corollaries on point for space law.
176
ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 258 (noting that UNCLOS III was
“designed to bring security to the oceans, and with it an enhancement of the
peaceful uses of the oceans through maritime confidence building”); United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS III].
177
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.
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a. Law of the Sea
As an initial matter, the law of the sea—comprised of treaties
(e.g., UNCLOS III) and customary international law—“developed
principally with peacetime situations in mind. Nothing in the law
of the sea impairs a State’s inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense, or rights during armed conflict.”178 More specifically,
the Preamble of UNCLOS III recognizes an aspiration to establish “a
legal order for the seas and oceans which . . . will promote the
peaceful use of the seas and oceans . . . .”179 Additionally, Article 301
provides that “States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”180
Renowned as the “constitution” for oceans, UNCLOS III
specifies in detail “practically every aspect of the use and resources
of the seas and the oceans.”181 As of March 8, 2020, there are 157
signatories and 168 parties to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea; however, the United States remains a nonparty.182
Although President Ronald Reagan, on behalf of “the United States
famously declined to ratify the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, [he] recognized much of it as governing U.S. practice and
eventually as customary international law.”183
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1.
UNCLOS III, supra note 176, pmbl.
180
UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 301 (emphasis added). This reads like
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
181
JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA 48 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
182
See Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION:
STATUS
OF
TREATIES,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI
-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/M8B7-69YD] (last
visited Apr. 13, 2021); Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., What is the law of the
sea?, NAT’L OCEAN SERV., https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lawofsea.html
[https://perma.cc/4E99-XTJU] (last updated Feb. 26, 2021) (“While the United
States ratified the 1958 Convention, as of late 2013, it had not become a party to the
1982 Convention. The United States recognizes that the 1982 Convention reflects
customary international law and complies with its provisions.”).
183
KOH, supra note 90, at 18; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2
(observing that the United States did not sign UNCLOS III in 1982 because of the
deep seabed mining provisions, “[h]owever, in 1983, the United States announced
that it was prepared to accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests . . .
relating to traditional uses of the oceans”).
178
179
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Notably, general international law tends to supersede the law of
the sea on the question of use of force and its related limitations.184
Because “the modern law of the sea” was drafted without
prioritizing wartime military operations, its effect is on “military
operations at sea during peacetime, particularly the movement of
naval vessels through the territorial sea, international straits, and
archipelagic waters of foreign states.” 185 Any State’s military
operations or act of self-defense that are “consistent with
international law,” is unaffected by “the use of the high seas for
peaceful purposes . . . .” 186 However, these obligations to other
States may become malleable during wartime, based on the
military’s needs and consideration of the law of war.187
i.

Sovereignty Over Waters

In 1983, the United States agreed to abide by the same
“traditional uses of the oceans” as those under UNCLOS III for
“navigation and overflight rights and freedoms . . . .”188 Waters are
subjected to either a State’s sovereignty (national waters) or not
(international waters). 189 National waters may include “internal
waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters.” 190 On the other
hand, international waters “include contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), and the high seas.”191 A State’s freedom in
the high seas provides for warships to exercise “task force
maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, surveillance,
intelligence gathering activities, and ordnance testing and firing.”192

184
See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 260 (noting that Article 301 of
the UNCLOS defers to Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, prohibiting any use of force
contrary to the Charter).
185
See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 260. See also id. at 266 (stating
that the law of the sea acknowledges that the “high seas are reserved for peaceful
purposes”).
186
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1 (identifying the similar
interpretation of “peaceful purposes” in “use of outer space”).
187
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.1.
188
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2.
189
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.
190
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.
191
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.3.
192
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.3.1 (observing that exercising these
rights must be balanced with “the interests of other States”).
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As the high seas make up the majority of the earth’s waters and
are not “subject to the sovereignty of any one state,” a State may take
claim to “only a narrow margin around” its sovereign coastline.193
The United States claims a territorial sea194 of twelve nautical miles,
and “a contiguous zone extending [twenty-four] nautical miles” that
follows international law and does not intersect another State’s
territorial seas,195 up to twelve nautical miles.196 Also, archipelagic
States (e.g., Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines) claim sovereignty
over “waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with” UNCLOS III.197
ii.

Innocent Passage

Innocent passage is a right that allows foreign vessels to navigate
in and through another State’s territorial sea and archipelagic waters
without fear of harassment.198 In times of peace, all ships possess
this right, but innocent passage does not apply to a belligerent
State’s ship in times of armed conflict.199 Additionally, belligerent
States may establish a maritime zone during an armed conflict that
limits neutral vessels’ ability to navigate their territorial seas and
archipelagic waters. Meanwhile, “neutral States may regulate, and
even prohibit, belligerent warships and prizes from entering their
territorial seas and archipelagic waters.”200
Article 19 of UNCLOS III defines what is and is not innocent
passage accordingly:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.
Territorial seas are adjacent to a State’s coastline. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.
195
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.1.2.
196
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.2.
197
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.3. Archipelagic States are
composed in whole or in part by at least one archipelago, which is a cluster of
“islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting water, and other natural
features that are so closely interrelated that they form an intrinsic geographic,
economic, and political entity or that historically have been regarded as such.” Id.
198
See ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 172, at 76; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra
note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4.
199
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4.
200
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 13.2.2.4.
193
194
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passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention
and with other rules of international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defen[s]e or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defen[s]e or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any
aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any
military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wil[l]ful and serious pollution contrary to
this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of
communication or any other facilities or installations of
the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.201

201

UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19.
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In sum, the express prohibitions under Article 19(2) include a
mixture of military and economic activities.202
b. Applying the Law of the Sea to Outer Space: Two Ships in the Night
Currently, space law does not provide a corollary to the concept
of innocent passage, 203 as no State in outer space may claim
sovereignty, 204 which is an inherent feature of territorial seas and
archipelagic waters. Within paragraph 14.10.1 of the DoD Law of War
Manual, the military classifies outer space as being both legally
distinct from airspace and “analogous to the high seas in certain
respects.” 205 Similarities to the high seas include the proposition
that “space systems of all nations have rights of passage through
space without interference.”206
But it does not take much imagination to see why States should
desire the same right of innocent passage there because “they could
engage in military patrols and use space resources for their own
benefit. Popular culture exemplified this way of thinking. Star Trek
named its ship the USS Enterprise, made its commander a Captain,
and placed it under the command of a Starfleet.”207 Already, States
perform data collection on each other in space, “providing an
information conduit for enhanced military operations. Space also
provides an environment for widespread commercial activity, from
television transmissions to GPS location services.” 208 After all, it
only may take a single misunderstanding to spark an international
crisis among the stars.

See UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19(2).
See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space,
INT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SPACE SAFETY 13 (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/lsc/2017/tech-05.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ3D-BUM8] (proposing that either an amendment to a
current treaty or new treaty altogether could establish innocent passage for all “like
the High Seas, open to peaceful use”).
204
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 34, at art. II.
205
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1.
206
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.1 (citing Outer Space Treaty, at
art. I).
207
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216.
208
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 216.
202
203
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For example, two spaceships—the USS Enterprise 209 and the
Millennium Falcon 210 —passing in the night at warp speed 211 will
need to avoid any potential collisions. Do they follow the same
protocols as if at sea212 and pass by each other safely, or because of
an absence of rules simply hope and pray that they do not crash?
Under Rule 14 of the Convention on the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGs”), these two spaceships
“meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses” may avoid a
head-on collision by altering their “course to starboard so that each
shall pass on the port side of the other.”213
Moreover, within the confines of both the USS Enterprise and
Millennium Falcon are likely sovereign territories. When at sea,
“[s]hips have for centuries had a formal link with a state, signified
by flying that state’s flag. Thus even vessels in private ownership
are ‘instrumentalities’ that have the flag state’s nationality.”214 Here,
the USS Enterprise would be sovereign territory of the United States
as it wears that flag, and the Millennium Falcon is privately owned,
so it would be an instrumentality for the appropriate jurisdiction.215
If spaceships are given a flag State’s nationality, then one would be
able to discern “which law can apply on board and which [S]tate can

209
Enterprise,
STAR
TREK,
https://www.startrek.com/database_article/enterprise [https://perma.cc/2RBSTQAP] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (“The ship arguably gained its status as the most
famous space-exploration vessel in history due to its historic five-year mission from
2264-2269.”).
210
Millennium
Falcon,
STAR
WARS,
https://www.starwars.com/databank/millennium-falcon
[https://perma.cc/JG82-YAJR] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021) (“An extensively
modified Corellian light freighter, the Millennium Falcon is a legend in smuggler
circles and is coveted by many for being the fastest hunk of junk in the galaxy.”).
211
This hypothetical requires some suspension in belief that: (1) spaceships
can travel at warp speed; (2) accident-avoidance technology exists for spaceships
traveling at warp speed; (3) Starfleet descends from the United States Space Force;
and (4) the USS Enterprise and the Millennium Falcon could be in the same universe
and timeline.
212
United Nations Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, adopted Oct. 20, 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 18 [hereinafter
COLREGs],
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201050/volume-1050I-15824-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK4Q-WP68].
213
Id. at Rule 14(a).
214
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.
215
Millennium Falcon, supra note 210 (noting that there have been a “succession
of owners,” so research will be required to determine the sovereign jurisdiction).
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assert a right of protection, that is, to assert rights under
international law in respect of the instrumentality.”216
Additionally, a State’s fleet of spaceships may be akin to an
archipelago, deserving of a territorial sea of outer space. Would the
Millennium Falcon receive innocent passage if traveling between the
USS Enterprise and other Starfleet spaceships—the archipelago—
when planning to violate Article 19(2)(g) of UNCLOS III by “loading
or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations”217 of
the United States? Under these facts, the Millennium Falcon will not
receive innocent passage under UNCLOS III because “while vessels
on the high seas are, in principle, subject to exclusive jurisdiction of
their flag states, enforcement action is possible on the high seas in
exceptional circumstances, for example when a ship is engaged in
piracy . . . .”218 Moreover, international law provides no safe harbor
for pirates (even space pirates) because they are the “common
enemies of all mankind.”219
Finally, if the Millennium Falcon did not fly under a state flag as
a pirate spaceship, then “on the high seas and in foreign ports,
particular circumstances, such as a collision, illegal use of the vessel
or exploitation of the sea’s resources, may lead to a [S]tate other than
the flag [S]tate having an interest in the application of law on or to a
ship.”220 On the other hand, the USS Enterprise and other Starfleet
spaceships, if considered “warships” at sea, would hold “complete
immunity on the high seas” of space because they would “not
generally [be] engaged in police functions.”221 Warships’ “activities
are part of a sovereign [S]tate’s armed capabilities. Their use of the
seas, for example for naval exercises, is subject to general
international law of responsibility. This includes the duty of [S]tates
to warn of any hazard . . . .”222 The USS Enterprise and other Starfleet
spaceships may stop the Millennium Falcon because “pirates should
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.
UNCLOS III, supra note 176, at art. 19.
218
HENDERSON, supra note 97, at 71.
219
RUWANTISSA I.R. ABEYRATNE, FRONTIERS OF AEROSPACE LAW 108 (2002). The
definition of a pirate is quite the opposite of an astronaut.
220
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389. Also, “[i]f the ship enters the territorial
waters of another state, or those internal to that state, legislative jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the flag may arise; and, because of the ‘territorial’ position
of the ship, the coastal or post state has exclusive enforcement jurisdiction.”
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 389.
221
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 416.
222
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 416.
216
217
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be lawfully captured on the high seas by an armed vessel of any
particular [S]tate, and brought within its territorial jurisdiction for
trial and punishment.”223
V.

SHAPING THE FUTURE OF SPACE WARFARE

In 1988, the United States was the only dissenting nation when
the U.N. General Assembly “passed a resolution calling for general
and complete disarmament under effective international control so
that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and
not become an arena for an arms race.”224 On the other hand, in his
2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Barack Obama
acknowledged that not even “America—in fact, no nation—can
insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow
them ourselves. For when we don’t, our actions appear arbitrary
and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how
justified.”225 The DoD recognizes that the OST “imposes restrictions
on certain military operations in outer space (i.e., it does not exempt
military spacecraft or military space activities from its purview).”226
Although it appears that in recent days, the United States has not
provided legal justifications for every military action, the Space
Force should “take care to offer a legal argument for [its] use of
force.”227
The United States and its President remain “powerful players in
the making and unmaking of international law.”228 So, it is in the
best interest of the Space Force that the President brings forth a
ABEYRATNE, supra note 219, at 108.
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 208 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). The vote was 154 to 1. RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 208.
225
Obama, supra note 106 (stating further that “this becomes particularly
important when the purpose of military action extends beyond self-defense or the
defense of one nation against an aggressor.”).
226
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 56, ¶ 14.10.2.1. The DoD Law of War Manual
mentions that the “collective view of all departments of the US Government is not
necessarily reflected in its pages, and the reader is therefore somewhat left to
speculate as to its actual status and claimed authority in international law.”
BOOTHBY & HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG, supra note 42, at 2.
227
GRAY, supra note 97, at 30 (“President Trump has not to date set out legal
justifications for the USA’s 2017 direct intervention in Syria at any length; he seems
to be relying on doctrines developed by the previous administration to explain his
escalation of the use of force.”).
228
KOH, supra note 90, at 14.
223
224
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“carefully negotiated global diplomatic solution that builds a
binding legal regime firmly rooted in international law.” 229 But,
even if “international law applies to space,” there is no clear answer
as to which specific laws “supply the rules that should apply.”230 As
a global commons, outer space may be compared with “other
environments” to answer complex legal problems that give rise to
“important consequences for regulation. Some, for example, have
compared space to the discovery of the New World in 1492, opened
by voyages of discovery and subject to claims of sovereignty.” 231
Generally, factors such as an activity’s “location” or “nature” may
provide the applicable “regime of international law” for a given
situation. 232 Space Force attorneys will need to understand the
effects of characterizing outer space to establish when an activity or
event is governed by an applicable law.233
Richard K. Gardiner, in his book International Law, states the
following:
International law presents two ways of defining or
describing the areas under consideration. First, there are the
law and procedural mechanisms which determine where the
boundaries of each area are. Specific or controversial
determinations of such boundaries are usually described as
‘delimitation’, particularly in the context of maritime areas.
Second, there are the characteristics which identify the
international regime in each area.
The process of
delimitation is primarily the active concern of lawyers
advising states who need to establish boundaries for
purposes of control, public order and responsibility, as well
as defen[s]e and exploitation of resources.234
Delimitation is critical to understanding the use of space,
because “although space law has been the subject of several treaties,
these do not define the location of outer space, or more specifically
its lower boundary.”235 The difficulty is that even using the plain
meaning of “outer space” as “beyond the atmosphere” remains a bit
229
230
231
232
233
234
235

KOH, supra note 90, at 80.
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 220.
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 215.
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 395.
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 396.
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 395-96.
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 400.
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hazy, “because the atmosphere becomes progressively thinner
without a precise line . . . .”236 Accordingly, Space Force attorneys
will need to tread carefully when drawing from analogies to the law
of war and law of the sea, and when current space law does not
provide a clear answer.
A well-delineated Space Force policy may act as a stopgap,
before States come together to create treaties or develop customary
international law on space warfare. Because the tools of “law and
policy” have different degrees of staying power for “internaliz[ing]
international norms[,]”237 the Space Force may use policy to have
flexibility in effectively troubleshooting military operations for
peaceful purposes, as required by the OST. To make legal
determinations prematurely may hinder the development of space
warfare by forming fixed points that are difficult to amend once
adopted. 238 For example, current international law allows for
orbiting “conventional weapons or new, exotic weapons such as
high-energy beams,” and for “nuclear warheads” to journey
“through space on their way to ground targets.”239 But, the future
of space warfare may allow the Space Force to “escalate a conflict by
destroying surveillance satellites or by temporarily jamming or
blinding them with space-based weapons . . . [or even] attack a
single node in an opponent’s military or government
telecommunications network, which would not permanently
destroy the whole network, but would degrade the system’s
reliability.” 240 As the Space Force will be making real-time
decisions, on-demand policymaking will likely be the short-term
solution to make better future law.
Ultimately, international cooperation will be required to solidify
“standards that govern the use of force” in space warfare.241 Time
and again, “disengagement from global governance” has been of
little help and ineffective 242 because of the “transnational legal
process. International law is no longer just for nation-states or
GARDINER, supra note 36, at 401.
KOH, supra note 90, at 18 (“Executive branch policies usually do not bind
future administrations as powerfully as do executive branch determinations about
the applicability of international legal rules.”).
238
See KOH, supra note 90, at 18.
239
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 217.
240
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 218.
241
Obama, supra note 106.
242
KOH, supra note 90, at 14 (noting that international legal norms and
principles have taken hold in the United States).
236
237
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national governments . . . . [It] has evolved into a hybrid body of
international and domestic law developed by a large number of
In The Trump
public and private transnational actors.” 243
Administration and International Law, Harold Hongju Koh, a former
Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State,244 argues that “these
many actors make and remake transnational law . . . by generating
interactions that lead to interpretations of international law that
become internalized into, and thereby binding under, domestic
law . . . .”245 These default rules become “difficult to deviate from
without sustained effort.”246 For example, the Space Force may use
existing international law as a gap filler for any “new and
unanticipated factual circumstance, . . . [with] a good-faith effort to
translate from the spirit of existing rules of laws (e.g., the laws of
war) to new situations . . . .”247 The end game for the United States
should be to partner with other States to develop a new international
treaty for reasonable and lawful space warfare.248
VI.

CONCLUSION

The unpredictability of the world—from widespread concerns
on security, climate change, natural disasters, and “unforeseen
developments caused by technological breakthroughs, extreme
human actions, and outbreaks of health hazards”—make a stable
Space Force indispensable. 249 Safeguarding space with a robust
regulatory regime “will be of quintessence importance to avert
dangers of serious economic imbalances or disastrous conflicts and
wars.”250 The Space Force will need to be ahead of the curve, and
should see that with great public and private economic
243
KOH, supra note 90, at 6-7 (italics omitted). More specifically, “sovereign
and nonsovereign actors include [the United States’] allies; state, municipalities,
and localities of the United States; government bureaucracies; the media; courts;
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); intergovernmental organizations (IGOs);
and committed individuals.” KOH, supra note 90, at 7.
244
Harold Hongju Koh, YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/haroldhongju-koh [https://perma.cc/TN6R-EV6Y] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).
245
KOH, supra note 90, at 7 (emphasis in original).
246
KOH, supra note 90, at 7.
247
KOH, supra note 90, at 10.
248
RABKIN & YOO, supra note 17, at 226–27 (providing an example of a potential
ban on exotic space-to-ground weaponry).
249
Murthi & Gopalakrishnan, supra note 141, at 29–30.
250
Murthi & Gopalakrishnan, supra note 141, at 42.
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opportunities, such as space tourism, comes great risk and
responsibility.251 The Space Force attorneys will have their work cut
out for them, but will certainly rise to the challenge.

251

ODUNTAN, supra note 25, at 273–74.
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